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Comment on Warth v. Seldin
By Terrance Sandalow1
Although Warth v. Seldin is carefully cast in procedural terms, its significance is substantive. The
real meaning of the decision is that the U.S. Supreme Court is not prepared to read into the federal
constitution a limitation on suburban zoning power like that which the New Jersey Supreme Court read
into the state constitution in Mt. Laurel.2 Warth is, thus, the Court’s most recent rebuff of the varied
efforts to use the fourteenth amendment as a weapon against the inegalitarian consequences of
metropolitan fragmentation.3 Those who see in the vague language of that amendment a remedy for
every social ill are sure to condemn the Court’s passivity in the face of that malady. Yet, there is, as Paul
Freund once wrote, “a morality of morality.” The mere existence of a social ill does not authorize the
courts to prescribe the cure.
The Substantive Significance of the Decision
In terms, Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court hews to the traditional theory that “standing” is
a threshhold question unrelated to the merits of the claim that the defendant has acted unlawfully. The
opinion carefully avoids any expression of the Court’s views on the question whether the exclusion of
low- and moderate-cost housing from a suburban municipality is constitutional. It rests dismissal of the
complaint solely upon the ground that none of the plaintiffs had a sufficient personal stake in the
outcome to justify a federal court’s adjudicating the validity of the Penfield zoning ordinance on their
behalf.4 In theory, accordingly, the validity of ordinances like Penfield‘s is open to adjudication in a
subsequent suit by a proper plaintiff.
Yet, despite the apparently limited ground underlying the dismissal, the effect of the decision is
to preclude any adjudication of the issue raised by the plaintiffs, not only in Warth but in any
subsequent case. The gravamen of the Warth complaint was that Penfield had violated the federal
constitution by adopting a zoning ordinance that prevented development of low- and moderate-cost
housing within its borders. In holding that neither potential developers nor potential residents of such
housing have standing to make such a claim unless local authorities have rejected a particular proposal
for development, the Court has not merely postponed adjudication of the exclusionary zoning issue. It
has eliminated the issue from future litigation. The effect of requiring a concrete proposal prior to
development will be to shift the focus of subsequent litigation from the issue the plaintiff in Warth
wanted to raise-the permissibility of excluding all low- and moderate-cost housing from a suburb- to the
quite different issue of whether rejection of a particular proposal is constitutionally permissible. The
focus, in other words, will be upon the issue so familiar in zoning litigation, whether the refusal to
permit a particular development at a particular location is “reasonable.”
To be sure, it is conceivable that a court confronted with rejection of a particular development
proposal might consider whether the rejection is unconstitutional solely because the ordinance does not
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provide for low- and moderate-cost housing anywhere within the municipality. It is hard to see,
however, how in such a case the court could avoid being influenced by the suitability of the particular
development at a particular location. More important, it is hard to see why the Supreme Court would
have imposed the standing requirement that it did unless it wished to cast federal constitutional
challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances in a mold that would require consideration of such issues.
It would be pointless to require a specific proposal as a condition precedent to suit if the details of the
proposal were then to be irrelevant to the issues posed by the suit.
The legal significance of the Court’s supposedly procedural decisions is, thus, to foreclose the
substantive issue plaintiff attempted to raise. The practical consequence is to preclude effective use of
the federal constitution to open suburbia to additional low- and moderate-cost housing. If every
rejection of a development proposal must be separately litigated under the uncertain standard of
“reasonableness,” the cost of formulating proposals and of litigating rejections is certain to deter all but
the most determined developers. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ real object in Warth, as the Court must have
known, was to reduce that cost by obtaining a ruling, such as that in Mt. Laurel, which would impose
upon suburban governments an obligation to free adequate land for low- and moderate-cost housing. A
decision that permits litigation only after rejection of a specific development proposal is quite as
inconsistent with that goal as would have been a decision avowedly denying plaintiffs’ claim on the
merits.
Exclusionary Zoning and the Fourteenth Amendment
The nominal defendant in Warth was the Town of Penfield. But the real defendant was a system
of governmental land use controls that many believe to be an important contributing factor to the
inadequate housing available to persons of moderate and low income. The real object of the litigation
was not to establish the right of such persons to live in Penfield, but to increase the housing supply
available to them, especially in those outlying areas of metropolitan regions that are experiencing
economic growth.
Not even the most zealous advocate of reform is likely to maintain that the constitution should
be read to invalidate an otherwise valid regulation of land use merely because it prevents persons of low
and moderate income from acquiring housing in a particular municipality. Even Justice Hall, writing for
the court in Mt. Laurel, felt called upon to qualify the newly created municipal obligation to “bear its fair
share of the regional burden” of low- and moderate-cost housing. The obligation, he wrote, existed only
because of the present fragmented system of land use control. Exclusion of such housing from some
municipalities would be permissible, his opinion strongly suggests, if it were the product of regional
planning5—unless, perhaps, the quantity and location of land made available for such housing were
even then inadequate to satisfy a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Thus, the real issue in Warth was not whether a municipality may constitutionally adopt a
zoning ordinance that effectively precludes development of moderate- and low-cost housing within its
borders, but whether the nationally prevailing system of land use controls is constitutionally infirm
because it unduly restricts the supply of such housing. The Court’s reluctance to confront that issue is
understandable—and right. Whatever can be said in favor of the Mt. Laurel decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court, could not possibly formulate meaningful and sensible standards for determining whether the
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supply of land for moderate- and low-cost housing is unduly restricted in the variant conditions of each
of the nation’s 200-odd metropolitan areas.
The primary objection to the Court’s undertaking such a task, however, applies equally to the
state courts: the issues raised are beyond the competence of a court. How, for example, is a court to
determine what is an adequate supply of land for low- and moderate-cost housing? Or what is each
municipality’s “fair share of the regional burden”? These questions are not—not even primarily—
technical ones appropriate for resolution by planners. The crux of the questions is political: whose
interests are to be sacrificed, and to what extent, to achieve what degree of additional choice for
persons of low- and moderate-income?6 Nothing in our constitutional tradition even remotely suggests
an answer to these questions.
In the absence of such a tradition, a constitutional resolution of the exclusionary zoning issue
represents nothing more than a statement of the judges’ personal value preferences. The encomiums
that have been lavished upon Mt. Laurel indicate that there are many who are happy to have the judges
write those preferences into constitutional law- at least SO long as the judges’ preferences coincide with
their own. Yet the day may come again when those who are now prepared to accept such grounds for
constitutional decision will respond more sympathetically to Justice Powell’s appeal to the “proper—and
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”
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